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CASE COMMENTS
No guideline has been established for determining when a person is
a chronic alcoholic.63 It is not clear what constitutes a symptom of
alcoholism. Would driving by an alcoholic while intoxicated be a
symptom? 4 Would an alcoholic's stealing in order to satisfy his
insatiable desire to consume alcohol be a symptom? 65 Despite these
and other unanswered questions, Hinnant brings the criminal law a
step closer to a true reflection of the values of our civilization.
ROBERT H. PowEuL, III
BLOOD GROUPING TEST RESULTS: EVIDENTIAL FACT
OR CONCLUSION OF LAW?
When a husband petitioning for divorce on the ground of adultery
alleges that he is not the father of a child born to his wife during
their marriage, he usually finds himself confronted by a rule of evi-
dence founded on the presumption of legitimacy,1 a "policy pre-
sumption" 2 which is not easily surmounted.3 The considerations
81; Pinardi, supra note 58; Rubington, The Chronic Drunkenness Offender, 315
Annals 65, 66-67 (1958); Well & Price, Alcoholism in a Metropolis, 9 Crime &
Delinquency 60, 60-61 (1963); 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 122, 127-28 (1962).
3Washington Post, April 1, 1966, § A, p. 1, col. 1; Washington Post, April 1,
1966, § A, p. 6, col. 3.
64Brief for Appellee, p. 23, Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
The early indications are that it will not be treated as a symptom. Washing-
ton Post, April 15, 1966, § B, p. 1, col. 4.
10 Brief for Appellee, supra note 64. The early indications are that it will be
treated as a symptom. Washington Post, April 15, 1966, § A, p. 1, col. 2.
11n most cases this policy presumption would be considered a rule of law
and be conclusive. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2492 (3d ed. 1940). But see infra
note 5. Some authors have been quite critical of such policy presumptions when
the evidence factually refutes the presumption. E.g.,
Presumptions of law or fact arise from incidents in which the courts do not
Imow what actually happened and for reasons of social discipline and policy
have assumed a non-existent fact from a known existing fact .... [Wlhen
the ignorance of their inception is cleared away by the discovery of science
or experience, we should discard them and proceed along the newly lighted
course. These presumptions of law often amount to a license to do wrong.
The use of scientific proof will curb this legal encouragement of illegality
.... [Aifter a method has been conclusively verified, we should not be
bound by presumptions in the face of it.
29 Iowa L. Rev. 121, 123-24 (1943).
2-"When a child X is born to a wife A married to a husband B, it is natural
to infer that the intercourse which begot the child was the intercourse of the
husband B, ie., that the child is legitimate." 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 163 (3d ed.
1940).
3McCormiclk states that "it is universally agreed that in the case of this
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behind this rule seek to protect children born during a legal marriage
from the stigma of illegitimacy;4 courts have deferred to this policy
by making proof of such illegitimacy difficult.5 A strict adherence
to this policy can result in a declaration that a man is legally the
father of a child when in fact he is not.6 A further injustice may
occur when a divorce is not granted because the adultery would
bastardize a child. Aid in the prevention of such injustice was realized
upon the discovery and medical acceptance of blood grouping tests
to determine nonpaternity.7 Such tests are usually acknowledged to
be competent evidence only if they exclude paternity.8
Blood grouping test results are material and relevant evidence in
both adultery-divorce and paternity proceedings. Where such evi-
dence is admissible in divorce proceedings, it will usually involve a
risk of bastardization. However, such a risk will rarely be involved
in a paternity suit, because the woman involved is usually not married.
In a paternity suit not involving a married woman, thus not involving
the risk of bastardization, the only basis for not regarding evidence
of blood grouping test results as conclusive is the possible unreliability
of those results; when the woman involved is married, hence the risk
of bastardization is involved, the presumption of legitimacy is a fur-
ther basis for exclusion of such evidence. The courts have had less
difficulty and been readier to admit such evidence when the risk of
bastardization is not involved.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held 4-3 in Houghton v. Hough-
ton9 that competently administered tests excluding the husband as the
presumption, the adversary contending for illegitimacy does have the burden
[of persuasion] . . . usually measured not by the normal standard for civil cases
but rather by the requirement of clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof
or even by the criminal formula, beyond a reasonable doubt." McCormick,
Evidence § 309, at 646-47 (1954).
4Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861, 872-73 (1965) (dis-
senting opinion); McCormick, Evidence § 309 (1954).
5'Presumptions have often developed into rules of substantive law. Here, how-
ever, the course of evolution has been from a rule of substantive law into a
rebuttable presumption. But the strictness of an older day when if the husband
was not beyond the four seas, the child was conclusively assumed to be his,
lingers in modified form." McCormick, Evidence § 309 n.31, at 646 (1954).6Bullock v. Knox, 96 Ala. 195, 11 So. 339 (1892).
7See generally Gradwohl, Legal Medicine 524 (1954).
Sld. at 534.
9179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965). All 3 dissenting judges were
opposed to permitting the blood test results to determine paternity conclusively.
Id. at 872. The only 1 who gave his reasons thought legislation necessary to
make blood grouping tests conclusive of paternity. Id. at 874. Since no dissenter
questioned the propriety of taking judicial notice of the accuracy of such test
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father of a child conceived during marriage provide conclusive evi-
dence of nonpaternity, thereby overcoming the presumption of legit-
imacy. The Supreme Court's reversal granting the appellant husband
a divorce on the ground of adultery was based solely on evidence of
paternity-excluding blood test results. 10
The wife had previously filed for divorce on the ground of extreme
cruelty. Nine months later she filed a supplemental petition alleging
that she had become pregnant due to the resumption of marital rela-
tions with her husband and once again sued for divorce on the ground
of cruelty. The husband's amended answer and cross-petition admitted
having relations with her, but denied any relations until after the
time during which she claimed to have become pregnant. He cross-
petitioned for a divorce on the ground of adultery. The child was born
7 /2 months after the date of the husband's admitted intercourse and
was fully developed at birth. The trial court found the husband to
be the father of the child and granted the wife an absolute divorce.
The husband's motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed,
alleging error in the trial court's failure to find that the results of
the blood tests excluding his paternity were conclusive and overcame
the presumption of the child's legitimacy. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska reversed, stating in the syllabus, "In the absence of evidence
of a defect in the testing methods, blood grouping tests are conclusive
on the issue of nonpaternity." 11 In the court's opinion the results
of the tests proved as a matter of law that the wife had committed
adultery. 2
The doctrine of the presumption of legitimacy-a child born to a
married woman during wedlock is prima facie legitimate-arose under
early English common law.' 3 The presumption was due to fear among
the nobility of disinheritance. 14 Early in the common law this pre-
sumption became conclusive unless the husband seeking to bastardize
the child could prove either that he was beyond the "four seas" at
all times during the relevant gestation period,15 or that he was under
some physical disability.16 Physical disability was shown if the hus-
results, the only basis for not admitting evidence of these results would be




13Banbury Peerage Case, 1 Sim. & St. 153, 57 Eng. Rep. 62 (1811).
14Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 159 (1852).
15Regina v. Murrey, 1 Salk 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 115 (1704); Rex. Albertson,
1 Ld. Raym. 396,91 Eng. Rep. 1163 (1698).
'0 Rolle's Abridgment of the Common Law reports that castration was con-
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band was impotent, sterile, or prepubescent.17 Gradually the rule of
the "four seas" was eroded 8 as the courts began allowing the hus-
band to show other evidence of nonaccess.19 Thus even if he was
within the "four seas," he was allowed to show that the necessary
access for him to be the father of the child was lacking.20 A means
of overcoming the presumption of legitimacy other than nonaccess
was acknowledged when evidence that the child was of a different
color from the putative parents, or, as it was quaintly put, "the child
was against the laws of nature," was permitted.21 All of these means
of overcoming the presumption evolved because courts recognized
that it would be impossible under the circumstances for the husband
to be the father.
22
The presumption of legitimacy caused considerable confusion in
the United States as to the quantum of proof necessary to overcome
it.2 3 Analytically it is a problem of the quantum of proof necessary
sidered such a physical disability. See Done & Egerton v. Hinton & Starky, Roll.
Abr. 358, pl. 8 (Eng. 1617), cited in 3 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 402, n.39 (repl. vol.
1960).
17Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings 20 (3d ed. 1953).
'SPendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Str. 925, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (1732).
191 Wigmore, Evidence § 134 (3d ed. 1940).
2OBanbury Peerage Case, supra note 15.
21Lord Campbell stated that "so strong is the legal presumption of legitimacy
that, in the case of a white woman having a mulatto child, although the hus-
band is also white, & the supposed paramour black, the child is presumed legiti-
mate, if there was an opportunity for intercourse." Piers v. Piers, 13 Jur. 569, 572
(Eng. 1849) (dictum), cited in 3 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 399, n.15 (rep1. vol. 1960).
In this country it has been held that such a birth would be against the laws
of nature and thus the presumption is overcome. Bullock v. Knox, supra note 6.
22Schatkin, supra note 17, at 20.
23E.g., Arkansas: Morrison v. Nicks, 211 Ark. 261, 200 S.W.2d 100 (1947), the
clearest evidence; Florida: Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163
(1944), evidence sufficiently strong to remove the presumption; Illinois: People v.
Powers, 340 Ill. App. 201, 91 N.E.2d 637 (1950), strong and compelling evi-
dence; Indiana: Duke v. Duke, 134 Ind. App. 172, 185 N.E.2d 478 (1962), clear evi-
dence; Kentucky: Ousley v. Ousley, 261 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1953), higher degree of
evidence than necessary to convict of a minor criminal offense; Massachusetts:
Commonwealth v. Stappen, 336 Mass. 174, 143 N.E.2d 221 (1957), proof beyond
all reasonable doubt; Missouri: Ash v. Modem Sand & Gravel Co., 234 Mo.
App. 1195, 122 S.W.2d 45 (1938), not overcome unless no judicial escape from
doing so; Nebraska: Zutavem v. Zutavem, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d 254 (1952),
clear and convincing evidence; Ohio: Ashley v. Ashley, 118 Ohio App. 155,
193 N.E.2d 535 (1962), clear and convincing evidence; Pennsylvania: Common-
wealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa. Super. 598, 29 A.2d 340 (1942), competent proof beyond
a reasonable doubt; Wisconsin: Schmidt v. Schmidt, 21 Wis. 2d 433, 124 N.W.2d
569 (1963), clear and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence.
CASE COMMENTS
to satisfy the burden of persuasion placed upon the party attempting
to bastardize the child.2 4 The Model Code of Evidence states:
Whenever it is established in an action that a child was born
to a woman while she was the lawful wife of a specified man, the
party asserting the illegitimacy of the child has the burden of
producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact
beyond a reasonable doubt [as in criminal cases] that the man was
not the father of the child.
2 5
In other words, to bastardize, it is necessary to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt the impossibility of the putative paternity.
20
The question now is whether courts will regard scientific blood
grouping tests as another method of showing impossibility of pa-
ternity. When the scientific facts derived from blood grouping tests
first became available, courts were reluctant to receive these facts in
evidence, probably because of a lack of understanding of the scientific
procedure involved and a desire to avoid change.
27
In some states the courts have understood and accepted the value
of these tests as a factual exclusion of paternity and have taken judi-
cial notice of their accuracy.28 These states acknowledged that the
results of blood grouping tests were receiving universal approval
as an exclusion of paternity among scientists knowledgeable in pa-
thology.29 The courts recognized that by continuing to disregard the
test results, which were considered scientifically accurate,30 they
24McCormick, Evidence § 309, at 646-47 (1954).
25Model Code of Evidence rule 703 (1942). (Emphasis added.)2GThis is easily understood because of the desire to keep a child legitimate.
This social policy is so strong in some states that the child is declared legitimate
even if the marriage is determined to be void. E.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 118
(West 1959); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4086 (1961).
2 7
In State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E.2d 962 (1939),
the court went to great lengths to avoid giving such test results conclusive weight
despite the fact that State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N.E.2d 428 (1938),
had affirmed a trial judge who granted a new trial when the verdict named the
defendant the father despite test results excluding paternity.
28"[J]udicial notice is one of the first hurdles a scientific test or experiment
must overcome in order to simplify methods of proof, and eventually achieve
the weight to which it is entitled." Richardson Modem Scientific Evidence, §
12.17, at 338 (1961).
Some courts have taken judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of
blood tests in the absence of statute. E.g., Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (Super Ct. App.
Div. 1950); State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936) (dictum).
29E.g., Commissioner ex rel. Tyler v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, N.Y.S.2d
804, 806 (1950) (concurring opinion).30E.g., Retzer v. Retzer, 161 A.2d 469, 471 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1960).
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would be ignoring new means of proof, which would result in deci-
sions contrary to those produced by the older policy.8 ' Reliability
of such tests may be proved, of course, by judicial notice through
resort to sources of indisputable accuracy.
82
In other states statutes make the test results admissible evidence.
Some statutes permit the test results in evidence only in bastardy
proceedings;.3 others permit them in both bastardy and divorce pro-
ceedings.8 4 Those states denying the admission of the test results in
divorce proceedings appear to have attached more importance to the
policy against making a child illegitimate than to the policy against
requiring a man to support a child not his own.
A majority of the states with statutes on this subject hold that the
test results are admissible only if they exclude the man as father of
the child. 5 In this respect the experts agree that the test results are
81E.g., Beach v. Beach, supra note 28.
S2 McCormick, Evidence § 325, at 691-92 (1954).
3 8Alabanza: Ala. Code tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1963) in conjunction with Mason
v. Mason, 276 Ala. 265, 160 So. 2d 881 (1964); Arkansas: Ark. Star. Ann. §
34-705.1 (repl. vol. 1962); California: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1980.6; District of
Colwnbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2347 (Supp. V 1966); Louisiana: Williams v.
Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956), has held that in a divorce proceeding
the husband is not entitled to prove adultery by means of blood test results;
Maryland: Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1965); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 15-8-13 (1956); West Virginia: W.Va. Code Ann. § 4776(1) (1961).
a4 Colorado: Colo. Rev. Star. Ann. § 52-1-27 (perm. supp. 1960); Connecticut:
Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. § 52-184 (1958); Illinois: M11. Ann. Star. ch. 106%, § 5
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); Indiana: Ind. Ann. Star. § 3-658 (Supp. 1965); Maine:
Me. Rev. Star. Ann. tit. 19, § 262 (1964); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 273,
§ 12A (1956); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 383-08 (Supp. 1964); Nevada:
Nev. Rev. Star. § 56.020 (1951); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Star. Ann. §
522:1 (1955); New Jersey: NJ. Star. Ann. § 2A:83-2 (1952); New York: N.Y.
Family Ct. Act § 532; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Star. § 8-50.1 (Supp. 1965);
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 2317.47 (Baldwin 1964); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 109.250 (1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp. 1965);
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-716 (Supp. 1965); Wisconsin: Wis. Star. §
325.23 (1963).
3 5 A1abama: Ala. Code tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1963); Arkansas: Ark. Star. Ann.
§ 34-705.1 (repl. vol. 1962); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Star. Ann. § 52-1-27 (perm.
supp. 1960); District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2347 (Supp. V 1966);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. § 52-184 (1958); Indiana: Ind. Ann. Star.
§ 2-658 (Supp. 1965); Maine: Me. Rev. Star. Ann. tit. 19, § 262 (1964); Maryland:
Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1965); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 273, § 12A (1956); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Star. § 56.020 (1951); New Jersey:
N.J. Star. Ann. 2A:83-2 (1952); New York: N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 532; Ohio:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.47 (Baldwin 1964); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 15-8-13 (1956); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-716 (Supp. 1965);
West Virginia: W.Va. Code Ann. § 4776 (1) (1961); Wisconsin: Wis. Star.
§ 325.23 (1963).
CASE COMMENTS
conclusive only in excluding the putative father.30 The results might
show him to have a blood type which the father of the child must
have had; but this only indicates that of all the people of that blood
type or group, he, as well as anyone else with that blood type or
group, could have been the father of the child. 7  (There is some
authority for the opinion that as new types and groups are discovered
and the information concerning them is made available, it will be
possible eventually for positive statistical probability proof of pater-
nity to be made.) 38 The states which have adopted the Uniform Act
on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity 9 permit admission of the test
results even if they do not exclude the putative father when the types
and groups of the parties involved are rare.40 In Alabama the statute
does not admit results if the experts disagree upon the findings or
conclusions, 41 while those states which have adopted the Uniform
Act allow the trier of facts to consider all the facts including the test
results and determine the paternity question if the experts disagree.42
Medical experts agree that blood groups never change during life-
time, and that by the laws of genetics it is indisputable that no indi-
vidual can possess a blood group factor which is absent in both of
his true parents.4 3 Therefore when the blood types of the mother and
child are known, medical experts can determine scientifically what
the blood type of the father may be and what it cannot be.44 The
medical profession does not claim that the tests are infallible even if
correctly administered, but instead admits that there are theoretical
exceptions-one in approximately every 50,000 to 100,000 cases.4 5 Such
exceptions, however, are of little importance when it is considered
that when "tests are accurately performed there is hardly any other
evidence that can approach in reliability the conclusions based on
36Davidsohn, Levine, Wiener, Medicolegal Application of Blood Grouping
Tests, 149 A.M.AJ. 699, 703 (1952).
3 7 McCormlck, Evidence § 178, at 382 (1954).
38Wiener, Parentage and Blood Groups, 191 Scientific American 78, 79 (July
1954).
309 Uniform Laws Ann. 102 (1952).40Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity § 4 (1952).
41Alabarza: Ala. Code tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1963).
42California: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1980.6; Illinois: Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106Y,
1 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); New Hamzpshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 522:4
(1955); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.258 (1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 28, § 307.6 (Supp. 1965).
43Allen, Diamond, Jones, Medicolegal Applications of Blood Grouping, 251
New England J. Medicine 146 (1954).
44Gradwohl, supra note 7, at 546 (1954).45Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702; Ross, cf. The Value of Blood Tests as Evi-
dence in Paternity Cases, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 466,468 (1958).
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such blood tests." 46 By considering the results of all of the tests which
are readily performable, the probabilities are one in one hundred
billion that such an exception will occur.47
In 1952 the American Medical Association Committee on Medi-
colegal Problems recommended judicial acceptance of blood test evi-
dence of nonpaternity as a substitution of scientific fact for opinion.48
According to its report, in tests upon families with a total of over
25,000 children, tests of the A-B-O groups revealed no exceptions to
the expected results which could not be explained either by labora-
tory error or by a case of illegitimacy.49 The Committee's report
stated:
The theory of multiple alleles50 leads to the following laws:
1. The agglutinogens A and B cannot appear in the blood of a
person unless they are present in the blood of one or both of his
parents. 2. A parent with blood of group AB cannot have a
child with blood of group 0, and a parent of group 0 cannot
have a child of group AB.51
In tests which were completed upon families with a total of over
10,000 children using the M-N type for identification, the Committee
46Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702.
47See, Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 466, 468 (1958).
This conservative estimate is based on information obtained on the A-B-O,
M-N and Rh-hr tests.4 8Schatkln, supra note 17, at 185.49Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702.
50Alleles is the term applied to members of a pair of contrasting genes. Sets
of alleles may contain more than two members and such sets are called multiple
alleles. Snyder & David, Heredity ch. 13, at 174 (5th ed. 1957).
5tDavidsohn, supra note 36, at 702. (Emphasis added.) See the following chart
for example.
MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS
BLOOD GROUP BLOOD GROUP BLOOD GROUP TO WHICH




A 0 O, B
A B O, B
B 0 O, A
B A O, A
AB A O, A
AB B O, B
AB AB 0
**Snyder & Davis, Heredity 183 (5th ed. 1957).
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reported that there were no exceptions to the predicted results which
could not be explained by cases of illegitimacy.52 The Committee
reported that
according to the generally accepted theory, the M-N types are
inherited by a pair of allelic genes M and N.... The theory leads
to the following two laws: 1. Agglutinogens M and N cannot
appear in the blood of a person unless they are present in the
blood of one or both of his parents. 2. A parent with blood of
type M cannot have a child with blood of type N, and a parent
with type N blood cannot have a child with type M blood.
53
Use of the Rh-hr blood types in studies on families with a total
of over 5,000 children revealed no exceptions to the theory that could
not be explained by cases of illegitimacy.54 The report stated:
For practical purposes the consequences of the genetic theory
can be summarized in the following laws: 1. Blood properties
Rho, rh', rh", hr', and hr" cannot appear in the blood of a per-
son unless they are present in the blood of one or both his parents.
2. A parent who is rh'-negative (cc) cannot have an hr'-negative
(CC) child; nor can an hr'-negative (CC) parent have an rh'-
negative (cc) child. 3. A parent who is rh"-negative (ee) cannot
have an hr"-negative (EE) child; nor can an hr"-negative (EE)
parent have an rh"-negative (ee) child.55
As a result of these studies, in cases where a man is falsely accused
of paternity, proof of nonpaternity by the A-B-O, M-N, and Rh-hr
tests can at present be expected to result in exoneration of over 50%
of those accused.5 6
S2Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702.
531bid. (Emphasis added.) See the following chart for example.
MEDICO-LEGAL APPLICATION OF THE BLOOD TYPES
TYPE OF TYPE OF TYPE TO WHICH







*Schatkin, supra note 17, at 170.
54Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 703.
551bid. (Emphasis added.) See Schatkin, supra note 17, at 171-92c, for full dis-
cussion of all the complexities.
56McCormick, Evidence § 179, at 380 (1954); Richardson, Modern Scientific
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When the legal profession does accept the test as positively exclud-
ing paternity, the problem of the weight to be given the test results
arises. Some courts hold that paternity-excluding test results should
be weighed equally with other evidence by the trier of fact.57 This
position has been strongly attacked:
In contested divorce actions... judges apparently prefer to ac-
cept the testimony of the wife rather than the objective blood
test findings, so that in courts of this country . . . not much
progress has been made away from the law of the 'four seas ....
When a court refuses to dissolve or annul a marriage of two com-
pletely incompatible people, even though there is scientific proof
of the wife's deceit or fraud .. the court would not appear to
be carrying out its responsibilities as an administrator of justice.5 8
Consideration of the blood test results equally with other evidence
has also been called judicial blindness to the advances of science.59
Medical experts and legal writers have also attacked the position of
those courts which consider the testimony of the expert who admin-
isters and interprets the results of the blood tests to be on the same
evidentiary level as regular expert testimony concerning hypothetical
situations.6 0 Unlike the testimony of the usual expert, the blood
grouping expert deals with nonhypothetical facts of the case at hand.
One medicolegal authority states that "the pathologist whose report
excludes paternity is not giving 'opinion' evidence, . . [but is] tes-
tifying to a fact of life and Nature." 61
The testimony of the parties in a paternity proceeding is seldom
highly credible. There is an understandable self-serving interest on
the part of each party which makes his testimony subject to doubt.0 2
The fact that the medical expert testifying in the case is a disinterested
Evidence § 12.3, at 324 (1961); Schatkin, supra note 17, at 206; Sussman, Blood
Grouping Tests in Disputed Paternity Proceedings, 155 A.M.AJ. 1143 (1954);
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702; Allen, supra note 43.
57E.g., Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954); Ross v. Marx, 24
NJ. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952); State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, 76 Ohio L. Abs.
393, 145 N-E.2d 162 (Juv. Ct. 1957).
58124 A.M.J. 776 (1944).
5NBeck v. Beck, 153 Colo. 90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963); Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274
Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278, 285 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
GODenton, Blood Groups and Disputed Parentage, 27 Can. B. Rev. 537, 547-48
(1949).
01Gradwohl, supra note 7, at 576 (1954).
62State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, supra note 57, at 165.
Chapter IX of Schatkin, supra note 17, describes a number of cases in which
the complaining female changed her testimony when faced with the blood tests
results. Unfortunately these are for the most part unreported cases.
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third person should make his testimony more credible than that of the
parties.
Where test results show that the husband could not possibly have
been the father of his wife's child, the only question remaining for
determination by the trier of fact is whether the tests were properly
conducted. This involves the procedures in administering the blood
tests, the qualifications of the persons testing the blood and inter-
preting the test. Authorities on legal medicine agree on the qualifi-
cations necessary for those who administer the tests and the general
procedures to be followed. The tests must be carried out and inter-
preted by an expert. For some authorities this means having a
pathologist or serologist, 63 not a medical technologist. However, there
is no reason why a medical technologist cannot qualify as an expert
in making such tests, leaving the pathologist or serologist as the inter-
preting expert. Houghton acknowledged that technicians were com-
petent to perform the tests under ordinary circumstances impliedly
because of the extensive education now required to become a medical
technician.
4
Authorities also stipulate steps which should be followed in per-
forming the tests and feel that in addition to the necessity of fresh65
and properly labeled 6 blood specimens, the expert should at all times
have a large panel of persons of representative blood groups and types
available from among whom he can obtain blood samples. These serve
as positive and negative controls of the various antibodies employedt
so that the reactions of known blood types can be compared with the
test specimens. The results of the control tests are to be included
in the final report.68 The main test should be completely carried out
for the A-B groups, the M-N types, and the Rh-hr types,69 and the
final report should contain the intermediate results for all tests per-
formed.70 Additional tests may be performed by equally qualified
colleagues of the expert performing the tests,71 thereby increasing the
63Denton, supra note 60, at 547; Richardson, supra note 56, § 12.15 citing
Denton's article; Schatkin, supra note 17, at 203; Sussman, supra note 56; David-
sohn, supra note 36, at 704.
64Houghton v. Houghton, supra note 9, at 866.
65Sussman, supra note 56.
6O6bid.; Denton, supra note 60, at 548.
67Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 704.
OSIbid.
69Schatldn, supra note 17, at 203.
7ODenton, supra note 60, at 548.
711bid.; Sussman, supra note 56, at 1144.
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credibility of the results. Some states permit the court to require
that tests be made by more than 1 expert.7 2
There has been some difference of opinion concerning the various
sera to be used-some writers require the expert to make the serum
himself,73 while others allow the use of commercially prepared
serum. 74 Those requiring the expert to prepare his own serum feel
that in this way he best acquires the experience needed for such
precise work.
75
The only areas in which the results of blood grouping tests should
be open to attack are in the method of testing or in the qualifications
of the persons performing the tests. In the event of error in one of
the aspects of the tests, the jury may be permitted to determine
from the evidence what effect such error will have on the evidentiary
weight to be afforded such test results. 76 A mere questioning of the
methods or persons employed should not be sufficient to allow the
jury to determine such weight; there should be evidence that there
was something materially wrong, e.g., failure to keep the test speci-
mens in a place inaccessible to interested persons.77 A better solution
in case of doubt is to recess the court or continue the case to allow
further testing.78 The evidence in such a situation is constant because
the blood types of the parties involved will never change.
Competently administered blood grouping tests which exclude pa-
ternity should be considered conclusive as a matter of law.79 Once
the results excluding paternity are no longer challenged, impossibility
of paternity comparable to the common law nonaccess has been
shown. When the courts recognize that the scientific results are much
72California: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1980.4; Maine: Me. Rev. Star. Ann.
tit. 19, § 262 (1964); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 383-09 (Supp. 1964); New
Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Star. Ann. § 522:2 (1955); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:83-2 (1952); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.47 (1964); Oregon: Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 109.254 (1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp.
1965); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-716 (Supp. 1965); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat.
§ 52.36(1) (1963).
'73Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 699.
741bid.
75Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 699.
7 0Commissioner ex rek Tyler v. Costonie, supra note 29, at 805 (1950).
77Denton, supra note 60, at 548.
7825 Iowa L. Rev. 823, 825 (1940).
79Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity § 5 (1952).
The A.M.A. Committee did not recommend that the courts be bound by the
test results when they excluded paternity. Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 703.
Richardson says this is due to a "deference to the judicial process rather than
any lack of faith in the test." Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence § 12.12,
n.34 (1961).
